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COMMENT

FAITH-HEALING AND RELIGIOUS-TREATMENT
EXEMPTIONS TO CHILD-ENDANGERMENT LAWS:
SHOULD PARENTAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES EXCUSE
THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE NECESSARY MEDICAL
CARE TO CHILDREN?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Each year, modern medicine saves the lives of countless children
who are critically ill. Yet, many children still die from common, treatable childhood illnesses, despite the availability of specially-trained doctors and advanced medical technology. This paradox exists because
some parents do not accept or utilize available health care systems, instead relying upon faith-healing or spiritual treatment (religious treatment) to cure an ill or injured child.'
State child-welfare statutes provide that failure by parents to seek
medical care constitutes child endangerment and neglect;2 in fact, parents have been charged with involuntary manslaughter in the death of
a child whose condition was medically treatable.' In contrast, parents
who substitute religious treatment for medical care are protected from
i. See, e.g., Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. App. 1985) (parents of nine-monthold daughter with bacterial meningitis treated disease exclusively with prayer, fasting, and scripture readings); State v. Miller, Nos. 86-CRM-30, 86-CRM-31 (Ohio C.P., Mercer County, Apr.
27, 1987) (parents chose to pray for their 23-month-old daughter's recovery from pneumonia
rather than to seek medical treatment); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 16-17,
497 A.2d 616, 620 (1985) (parents "relied on God" to cure their two-year-old son's Wilms'
tumor).
A number of religious groups, primarily fundamentalist Christian sects, reject traditional
medical care in favor of religious treatment. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d
266, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1986) (First Church of Christ (Christian Scientist)); People ex rel.
D.L.E. (D.L.E. II.), 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (General Assembly and the Church of
the First Born); State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. 1984) (Christ
Assembly); Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985) (Faith Tabernacle Church); see
also 52 Deaths Tied to Sect, The News-Sentinel (Fort Wayne, Ind.), May 2, 1983, at 1, col. 2
(Faith Assembly). See generally Note, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws:
Keeping the Faith Versus Medical Care for Children, 12 J. LEGIS. 243 (1985).
2. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987).
3. See, e.g., Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 231 N.E.2d 147 (1967); Dillon v. State, 574
S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971).
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criminal liability by exemptions in nearly every such state statute.4 Today, the tragic, agonizing deaths of children and adolescents who received no medical care 5 have provoked increasing public outcry over
the continued existence of religious-treatment exemptions6 and have

4. ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1986 Replacement vol.), § 13A-13-6(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986);
ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b) (1985 & Supp. 1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1974);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42.807(c) (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1986 Replacement vol.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (West
1975); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 1i, § 1104 (1979 Replacement vol.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
415.503(7)(f) (West 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2)
(1979); ILL. ANN. CODE ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4(a)(4)
(1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(1)(c) (1981); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.403(B)(4) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp.
1986-1987); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-701(g)(2) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, §
1 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-105(1)(i), (m) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-102(4) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5085 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169C:3 XIX(c) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-13(L)(4), (M)(4) (1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A517(21) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01 to .1-05.1(2) (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419.500 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40-11-15. (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B), (C)(3) (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 682(3)(C) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE § 16.1-228(2) (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
48.981(3)(c)(4) (West Supp. 1986-1987); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1986); see also WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (1986) (providing that "a person who is being furnished Christian Science treatment by a duly accredited Christian Science Practitioner shall not be considered,
for that reason alone, a neglected person").
5. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 133 Ariz. 157,
158, 650 P.2d 459, 460 (1982) (en banc) (obstructed bowel caused intestinal rupture; digestive
fluids spilled through defective part of abdominal wall, resulting in infection and death). In State
v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. 1984), the court described the child's
suffering as follows:
Whatever the parents' subjective perception of baby Seth's observed symptoms might
have been and however intensely they may wish to minimize their own responsibility and to
euphemistically characterize the event, the medical evidence presented in the course of this
trial establishes that their second child did not just slip away peacefully to be with the
Lord.
. . . From what started as a common childhood illness, from what started as a simple,
easily recognizable, well-known bacterial infection which responds to the most basic of
modern antibiotics, and at his home located within a few blocks of a modern, well-equipped
emergency hospital, which could have, in all likelihood, saved his life, Seth Miskimens
died. First came illness, then more serious illness, then suffering, and then as valiant a
struggle as his tiny heart and his weakened lungs would permit. And then after enduring
for as long as he could the tremendous pain inherent in the multiple diseases that were
attacking him, and then with a raging infection in his tiny chest, he weakened, he faltered,
and he died. There is no more gentle way to describe it.
Id. at 49, 490 N.E.2d at 938.
6. See, e.g., Legislators Wrestle with Legal Faith-HealingIssue, Dayton Daily News and
Journal Herald, Mar. 6, 1987, at 39, col. 3; Mortimer, State Should Stop Needless Deaths,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 27, 1986, at 9A, col. 1; Religious Exemption Attacked, Columbus
Dispatch, Mar. 15, 1985, at 6D, col. 4; Zlatos, A Child's Death: An Act of God-or Homicide?.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
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prompted a number of state legislatures to amend statutes containing
such exemptions.' In Ohio, House Bill No. 63,8 introduced in the
1987-1988 General Assembly, would remove the religious-treatment
exemption from all statutory language relating to child health and
welfare.

This comment focuses on the existence and impact of religioustreatment exemptions in state statutes protecting children and considers whether state legislatures should repeal such exemptions. First,

within the context of the current dilemma regarding religious treatment, this comment examines the limitations of the first-amendment
free-exercise clause. Second, this comment discusses the constitutional

rights of the parents, the minor child, and the state. Finally, the comment addresses the need for state legislatures to remove from child
health and welfare statutes provisions providing immunity to parents
who rely on prayer instead of medicine to treat their ill child.
II.

BACKGROUND

The United States Supreme Court has on many occasions considered the scope of the first-amendment clause providing for free exercise
of religion 9 and has generally allowed an expansive reading of the
clause. At the same time, the Court has recognized the importance of
competing governmental interests in placing limitations on the availability of first-amendment protection. 10
Although the Supreme Court has had to respond to religion-based
first-amendment challenges in a variety of contexts," it has yet to specifically address the extent that the first amendment should protect reliNat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 6, col. I.
7. See, e.g.. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1988) (amendments eliminated
the statutory defense of spiritual treatment in all but minor or trivial illnesses) (quoted infra note
186).
8. 117th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1987-1988). H.B. 63 would amend §§
2151.03, .421, .99 and 2919.22 of the Ohio Revised Code by removing religious-treatment exemptions from the definition of "neglected child."
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
10. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
I1. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents challenged Wisconsin
statute requiring children to attend high school until age sixteen); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (Seventh-day Adventist challenged the State's refusal to pay unemployment benefits
when she was fired from her job for refusing to work on the Sabbath day of her faith); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Jehovah's Witness challenged two sections of Massachusetts' comprehensive labor laws that prohibited minors from distributing religious literature);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (member of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints
challenged statutory
Published
by eCommons,
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gious-treatment exemptions in child welfare statutes. When the Court
was presented with the opportunity to consider whether parents motivated by religious conviction can deny life-saving or risk-reducing medical care to their children, it affirmed the lower court decision without
opinion. 12 Consequently, state courts considering first-amendment challenges to religious-treatment exemptions must rely on Supreme Court
decisions in other free-exercise-of-religion contexts.13
A.

The Scope of the First-Amendment Free-Exercise Clause

Parents who rely on faith-healing or spiritual treatment for their
child claim that their conduct is protected by the first amendment's
guarantee of free exercise of religion." Although the United States Supreme Court has endorsed an expansive reading in a number of cases
challenging restrictions on first-amendment protection, situations do exist where governmental interests outweigh protection of religious
beliefs.
In Reynolds v. United States," the United States Supreme Court

examined whether the free-exercise clause protected a polygamist who
claimed that his religious belief in polygamy was acceptable justification for violation of the law prohibiting its practice. 6 Focusing on the
intent of the Framers, the Court stated that although "Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, [it] was left free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order."' 7 Although government is not free to interfere with "mere
religious belief and opinions," it may interfere with religious practices
since "[]aws are made for the government of actions."' The Court
stated:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government
under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a
wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral
pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil gov-

12. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968), aff'g mem. 278 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (parents cannot deny needed care when the denial exposes their
children to ill health or death).
13. See cases cited supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 912 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); People ex rel
D.L.E. (D.L.E. I), 614 P.2d 873, 873-74 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App.
3d 191, 192-93, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1382-83 (1986).
15. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 164.
18. Id. at 166.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
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ernment to prevent her from carrying her belief into practice?"

The Court held that conduct otherwise criminal could not be defended
on the grounds that it was based on religious beliefs.20 To permit a
criminal defendant to invoke the free-exercise clause would "make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,"2
and the Court was unwilling to go that far.
The free-exercise clause was first applied to the states in Cantwell
v. Connecticut.2 In Cantwell, the Supreme Court had to determine

whether the playing of a highly offensive record attacking all organized
religions and branding Catholicism as especially evil was protected by

the first amendment.2 3 The Court rejected the belief-action dichotomy
of Reynolds24 and instead determined for the first time that the first-

amendment free-exercise clause included both freedom to believe and
freedom to act.28 While freedom to believe was held to be absolute,
states were permitted to regulate religious belief-based acts public

safety considerations were implicated, so long as they do not "unduly
. . . infringe the protected [religious] freedom[s]. '"26
Following the decision in Cantwell, the Supreme Court in Prince
v. Massachusetts" had to review again a conflict between religious ac-

tivity and the limits of governmental authority. This time, however, the
state's responsibility to protect children was also involved. In Prince, a

member of the Jehovah's Witnesses was convicted of violating Massachusetts' child labor laws28 when she provided religious literature to her
19. Id.
20. Id. at 166-67.
21. Id. at 167.
22. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Court held that the free-exercise clause of the first amendment was applicable to the states through the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 303.
23. Id. at 301-03.
24. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
25. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. The Cantwell Court upheld the conviction of members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses who solicited contributions for religious literature in a door-to-door canvas in
violation of a Connecticut statute that prohibited, inter alia, solicitation of money or subscriptions
for a religious cause without the approval of the Secretary of the Connecticut State Public Welfare Council. Id. at 301-03.
26. Id. at 304.
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. The law stated that
[n]o boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any
newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any description,
or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any street or public
place.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 69 (1939) (amended 1972), quoted in Prince, 321 U.S. at 160-61.
Furthermore, it was also a violation of the child-labor laws for anyone to furnish or sell articles to
an underage child knowing of the child's intent to sell such articles. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 161
(citing MAss: GEN. L. ch. 149, § 80 (1939)).
Published
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nine-year-old niece, knowing that the girl planned to distribute it on
public streets.2 9 The defendant asserted that her conduct was protected
by first-amendment guarantees of freedom of religion and also was protected by her right, as her niece's guardian, to allow her niece to distribute such religious literature."0
The Supreme Court in Prince openly admitted that "[t]o make
accommodation between these freedoms and an exercise of state authority always is delicate," especially when issues relating to religious
freedoms and parental rights are concerned. 1 The Court held, however, that neither parental authority nor the right to practice religion
freely included "liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."3 " In contrast,
Justice Murphy argued in his dissent that the state had failed to carry
its burden of proving that a grave or immediate danger existed with
respect to a protected interest.33 Relying on the Court's opinion in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette," Justice Murphy
stated that "[i]f the right of a child to practice its religion. . . is to be
forbidden by constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that
such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state
or to the health, morals or welfare of the child.""
Twenty years after Prince, in Sherbert v. Verner,3 6 the standard
articulated in Justice Murphy's dissent in Prince reappeared in the
Sherbert majority opinion. In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church was fired from her job for refusing to work on Saturday, her religion's Sabbath day. Consequently, the State of South Carolina refused her claims for unemployment compensation benefits because she had refused "to accept available suitable work when
offered."3 7 Applying the standard set out in Justice Murphy's Prince

29. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160-62.
30. Id. at 163. According to the Court, the niece herself insisted that "it was her religious
duty to perform this work and [that] failure would bring condemnation 'to everlasting destruction
at Armageddon.'" Id.
31. Id. at 165.
32. Id. at 166-67.
33. Id. at 174 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
34. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Supreme Court in Barnette affirmed a district court decision
enjoining the enforcement of a regulation of the West Virginia Board of Education that required
public school children to salute the American flag. The Court stated that, unlike other areas
where legislative restrictions are upheld upon a mere showing of a rational basis for the enactment, restrictions on freedom of speech and press are only permitted to "prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." Id. at 639.
35. Prince, 321 U.S. at 174 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
36. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
37. Id. at 401 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 68-114(3)(a)(ii) (Law Co-op. 1962) (current
version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(3)(a)(ii) (Law Co-op. 1986))).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
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dissent, the Supreme Court held that a state could not legitimately burden the free exercise of religion unless the state could show both a compelling state interest in the regulation and the absence of a less restrictive alternative means to accomplish the intended result. 88 The
Sherbert decision greatly expanded the protection afforded by the firstamendment free-exercise clause.
The expansive reading of the free-exercise clause was endorsed by
the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder 9 where once again the
Court held that a secular regulation could not restrict religious conduct
in the absence of a compelling state interest. In Yoder, members of the
Amish faith were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory-schoolattendance law, which required that parents send their children to either private or public school until the age of sixteen.40 Amish parents
refused to send their children to public school after the eighth grade
because they feared that their children would be exposed to the lifestyle of the secular world, which was one contrary to their own simple
way of life. "1 The Supreme Court held that the omission of one or two
years of education would not be mentally or physically detrimental for
a child.4 In addition, the Court did not agree with the state's argument
that absence of the Amish children would cause them "an inability to
be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of
society."4 3 Since the Amish had "convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, ' 44 and since they had provided an alternative mode of education to fulfill the same goal the state sought to
achieve, the Supreme Court determined that enforcement of the schoolattendance requirement "would gravely endanger if not destroy" the
free exercise of Amish beliefs.' 5 Consequently, the Court held that,
under the first and fourteenth amendments, Amish parents could not be
compelled to send their children to high school.46
Since the Sherbert and Yoder decisions, the Supreme Court has
again closely examined the limits of the free-exercise clause. In United
States v. Lee,'7 the Court had the opportunity to expand even further
the protection of the clause. Instead the Court redirected its focus, giv-

38. Id. at 403, 406-09.
39. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
40. Id. at 207-08.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 234.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 235.
45. Id. at 234.
46. Id. at 219.
47. by455
U.S. 252 (1982).
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ing more weight to governmental interests. In Lee, an employer refused
to pay social security taxes because under his Amish faith, he and his
coreligionists were already obligated to provide each other with similar
financial assistance.48 Despite the fact that Congress had exempted
Amish employees from paying social security taxes, "9 the Court held
that neither the statutory provision nor the free-exercise clause exempted Amish employers from paying the tax because the governmental interest in having a social security system was compelling and was
not overridden by religious freedom. 0
B.

Judicial Response-Exposing the Dilemmas Before State Courts

Prior to the enactment of religious-treatment exemptions, courts
rarely hesitated to convict parents who failed to provide proper medical
care for their ill children." However, since the addition of such exemptions, courts have faced dilemmas in two major areas. First, courts
have determined whether medical care should be provided to ill children despite parental religious objections. In such cases, examination of
the child's best interests usually has led courts to order medical care.
Second, courts have considered whether to criminalize parental conduct
when a child dies after receiving only religious treatment. While generally courts have been reluctant to impose criminal liability in such
cases, some state courts, however, are convicting parents despite the
existence of a seemingly applicable religious-treatment exemption.
1. Providing Medical Care to Ill Children
Generally, courts have not been hesitant to intervene in situations
where parents deny their minor children necessary blood transfusions."'

Id. at 254-55.
See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1982). The section provides in part:
Any individual may file an application . . . for an exemption from the tax imposed by
this chapter if he is a member of a recognized religious sect or division thereof and is an
adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division by reason of which he is
conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any private or public insurance
which makes payments in the event of death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes
payments toward the cost of, or provides services for, medical care (including the benefits
of any insurance system established by the Social Security Act). Such exemption may be
granted only if the application contains or is accompanied by (A) such evidence of such individual's membership in, and adherence to the
tenets or teachings of, the sect or division thereof as the Secretary may require for
purposes of determining such individual's compliance with the preceding sentence.
50. Lee, 455 U.S. at 256-61.
51. See, e.g., People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); see also Owens v. State,
6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911).
52. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), affid mem., 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104
N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
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When the refusal to consent is based on religious grounds," some

courts have nonetheless concluded that the right to practice religion
freely does not grant parents authority to expose their children to un-

necessary illness or death.54 It is not unusual for a court to order that a
child be made a ward of the state and then to authorize the child's
attending physician to determine and administer appropriate medical
care. 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court has gone so far as to apply
such protection to an unborn child."
Although courts have been more reluctant to mandate blood transfusions for nonconsenting adults,5" they have intervened when the adult
has minor children's or is pregnant. In Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan
Memorial Hospital v. Anderson," the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated that it was
unnecessary to decide [whether a pregnant adult may be compelled to
submit to a blood transfusion to save her life] because the welfare of the
child and the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be
impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them with respect to the
sundry factual patterns which may develop. 60

Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985. But see In re Estate of
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
53. See, e.g.. Wallace, 411 111. at 621, 104 N.E.2d at 771. In Wallace, Rhonda Labrenz, the
mother of the one-week-old child in need of a blood transfusion because of erthroblastosis fetalsis
(commonly known as an Rh factor problem), testified that
[W]e believe it would be breaking God's commandment to take away blood which he told
us to eat of the flesh but should not take of the blood into our systems. The life is in the
blood and blood should not be drained out. We feel that we would be breaking God's
commandment, also destroying the baby's life for the future, not only this life, in case the
baby should die and breaks the commandment, not only destroys our chances but also the
baby's chances for future life. We feel it is more important than this life.
Id. at 621, 104 N.E.2d at 772. Darrel Labrenz, the child's father, openly stated: "I object to the
using of the blood in connection with this case." Id.
54. Id. at 625, 104 N.E.2d at 773 (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (1943)); see also State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
55. See, e.g., King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. at 500.
Implicit in the issuance of these court orders is the finding by the court that the Jehovah's
Witnesses, despite their attempt both to provide proper medical care for their children and
to comply with the tenets of their faith, have been wilfully and grossly neglectful as to the
medical care necessary for the well-being of their children.
Id.
56. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 502-03 (1960) (ordering a blood
transfusion when physician determines one to be necessary).
57. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 I11.2d 361, 367-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 441-42
(1965).
58. Ex rel. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.) (community had interest in saving the life of the mother of minor children through use of blood transfusion), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
59. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
60. byId.
at 423, 201 A.2d
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Consequently, the court held that transfusions may be administered at
a physician's discretion when necessary to save the life of either the
6 l
mother or the child.
In addition to ordering blood transfusions for pregnant women and
children, courts have intervened in other cases where children had specific, demonstrable medical needs. In some cases, the medical condition
posed an imminent danger to the child's physical health; in other cases,
the threat was to psychological health alone.
The question before a New York family court in In re Sampsona"
was whether a fifteen-year-old boy should be compelled to undergo a
dangerous operation providing only partial correction of a facial deformity when his mother objected on religious grounds to the blood
transfusions required in surgery."8 The court considered two issues:
First, should surgery, especially risky surgery, be ordered in the absence of any medically-threatening condition? Second, should correction of the child's deformity override the mother's right to free exercise
of religion?
The fact that the child's medical problem was not life-threatening
was no bar to court intervention. The court held that a child's life need
not be endangered before a court could intervene."' Nor was the court
dissuaded by the risk involved in the operation. Looking to the child's
overall health and welfare and stating that developmental and psychological factors were of utmost importance, the court held that some risk
was acceptable.6 5
The court also found unpersuasive the first-amendment objections.
After analyzing first-amendment free-exercise cases, the court held
that despite the fact that
the mother's religious objections to the administration of a blood transfusion to her son . . . are founded upon the scriptures and are sincerely

61. Id.
62. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), affd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d
918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
63. 65 Misc. 2d at 665, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 648. Although not opposed to medicine or surgery
per se, the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, believed that blood transfusions were forbidden by the
law of God and, therefore, that her acquiescence would be a sin. Id. at 659, 317 N.Y.S.2d at
645-46.
64. Id. at 670, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 653. The child suffered from neurofibromatosis, which resulted in a severe facial deformity on the right side of his face and neck. Id. at 659, 317 N.Y.S.2d
at 643. But see In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (a twelve-year-old boy with
an uncorrected hair lip and cleft palate could not be ordered to undergo surgery against the wishes
of his parents, since no emergency threatened the child's health or life), rev'g 285 A.D. 221, 137
N.Y.S.2d 35 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (since the life of a sixteenyear-old male suffering from paralytic scoliosis was not in immediate danger, state could not ignore his parents' religious objections to surgery).
65. Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d at 672, 674-75, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655, 657.
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held, they must give way before the State's paramount duty to insure his
right to live and grow up without disfigurement-the right to live and
grow up with a sound mind in a sound body. 66
Consequently, the court left the doctors "completely free to exercise

their own professional judgment as to the nature, extent and timing of
any surgery that may be required for the correction of the [child's]
67
8

deformity."
Courts have also dealt with cases where death of the child is a
strong possibility even with medical intervention. In In re Willmann,"

it was brought out in court that the child would have an "uphill fight"
even if he were to undergo the surgery to which his parents objected."
Nonetheless, the court appointed a guardian ad litem and approved the
necessary medical care and treatment." Relying on Prince v. Massachusetts,7 1 the court stated that the child's best interests must be served

and "the authority of the parents must yield to that of the state...
because the faith of the parents, as firm and clear as it is, does not
permit them, under the law of this state and the nation, to expose [the
child] to progressive ill health and death. 7 2

Court decisions have demonstrated that there is a point at which
parental refusal of medical care for their children may warrant court
intervention. s In People ex rel D.L.E., 4 the Colorado Supreme Court
examined the imminency of the danger threatened by the mother's fail-

ure to comply with the recommended medical care program for her
66. Id. at 669, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
67. Id. at 675, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
68. 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (1986) (hospital sought to have the state assume guardianship of a seven-year-old child who suffered from osteogenic sarcoma, a particularly
malignant and rapidly spreading form of cancer).
69. Id. at 195, 493 N.E.2d at 1385.
70. Id. at 197, 493 N.E.2d at 1387.
Nowhere in the record [did] it appear, directly or by reasonable inference, that David's
parents maintain that the Center should not be permitted to provide the child with the
medical care, including chemotherapy and surgery, that it deems to be necessary because
such ministrations contravene scriptural laws, rules, edicts or, per se, their religious beliefs.
What [the parents] stoutly profess is that they believe by their interpretation of the Bible
that David has already been healed by divine intervention and that no treatment by mortal
hands need be afforded. For them, the healing is complete because it was accomplished two
millennia ago.
Id. at 197, 493 N.E.2d at 1388.
71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (discussed supra notes 27-32).
72. Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d at 199, 493 N.E.2d at 1389.
73. Compare People ex rel. D.L.E. (D.L.E. II), 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (discussed infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text) with People ex rel D.L.E. (D.L.E. I), 614 P.2d
873 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (discussed infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text).
74. (D.L.E. 1), 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (with the support of his mother,
twelve-year-old boy, brain damaged at birth and subject to grand mal epileptic seizures, refused to
Published
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son's periodic seizures. The court also considered expert testimony for
the parents that only a state of status epilepticus 8 would be life-threatening 76 and that Dilantin, the medication prescribed for the child to

control his seizure activity, had detrimental side effects." After considering the free-exercise rights of D.L.E.'s parents, the court held that he
was not a "neglected child" under the Colorado statute78 and therefore

permitted treatment solely by spiritual means.7
The Colorado Supreme Court was forced to reconsider whether
D.L.E. was a dependent child after he stopped taking his Dilantin, contrary to medical advice, and went into a state of status epilepticus8 °
resulting in permanent deficits." Upon close examination of the statutory language, the court reasoned that the religious-treatment exemp-

tion did not preclude ordering of medical intervention when a child's
life was in imminent danger and held D.L.E. to be a dependent child. 82
Relying on prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the

Colorado court concluded that
at least where a minor suffers from a life-threatening medical condition
due to a failure to comply with a program of medical treatment on religious grounds, [the statute] permits a finding of dependency and neglect
and does not violate the constitutional provisions protecting the free exercise of religion.8 3
Finally, in In re Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action No.

75.

Status epilepticus is "a condition in which one major attack of epilepsy succeeds another

with little or no intermission." STEDMAN'S

MEDICAL DICTIONARY

(5th Unabr. Lawyer's ed. 1982).

76. D.L.E. 1, 614 P.2d at 874.
77. The court relied on the doctor's testimony that a common side effect of Dilantin is
reduction in the formation of bone marrow and red and white blood cells. In addition, the doctor
testified that Dilantin may cause "gum hypertrophy, which is the swelling of the gum around the
teeth; ataxia, which is unsteadiness of gait; and 'headaches and other signs of increased cranial
pressure.' " Id. at 875.
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(20) (1986). The statute reads in part:
'Neglected or dependent child' or 'dependent or neglected child' means a child:
(d) Whose parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his health, guidance, or well-being;
(e) Who is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his parent, guardian, or
legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian.
79. D.L.E. 1. 614 P.2d at 874.
80. People ex rel. D.L.E. (D.L.E. II), 645 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo. 1982) (en banc). For a
definition of status epilepticus, see supra note 75.
81. These deficits included "flaccid paralysis of his left arm and leg, a nerve injury which
restricted movement in his right arm, a dislocated jaw, and continued seizure activity." D.L.E. !1,
645 P.2d at 273.
82. Id. at 274.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
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5666-4J)" the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether children
could be granted court protection merely because a brother had died
after receiving only religious treatment.8 5 The court stated that a
child's right to good health supersedes parental rights regarding religious belief; however, it did not grant the children court protection,
reasoning that their mother's belief in religious treatment had caused
harm only to their brother and had not endangered them. 86 Thus, while
acknowledging that parental religious freedoms were not absolute, the
court recognized the need to consider the interests of the parents as
well as the immediacy of the threat to the children."'
2. Prosecuting Parents Whose Children Have Died from Lack of
Medical Care
Despite religious-treatment exemptions to child-protection laws,
courts have become increasingly willing to convict parents of criminal
acts stemming from the deaths of their children." However, legislative
intent and the constitutionality of these exemptions continue to produce
dilemmas that challenge the courts. 9
In State v. Lockhart," defendants-appellees had been found not
guilty of first-degree manslaughter in their nine-year-old son's death

84. 133 Ariz. 157, 650 P.2d 459 (1982) (en banc) (after a woman's six-year-old son died
from septicemia and peritonitis secondary to perforation of an inguinal hernia, the state Department of Economic Security petitioned to have her seven remaining children declared dependent
because she had told caseworkers that "she had faith in miracles" and that she would not pursue
medical treatment for her remaining children should they become ill) [hereinafter Cochise County
Juvenile Action].
Septicemia is an infection in the blood caused by microorganisms and their toxic products.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY. supra note 75, at 1274. Peritonitis is an inflammation of the
connective tissue that lines the abdominal cavity and covers most of the organs therein. Id. at
1059.
85. Cochise County Juvenile Action, supra note 84, 133 Ariz. at 163-64, 650 P.2d at
465-66.
86. Id. at 163-64, 650 P.2d at 465-66. The court did state that "this would be a different
case were any of these children known to be ill." Id. at 161, 650 P.2d at 463. In such a case, the
court agreed, "failure to procure medical attention may amount to unwillingness to provide medical care." Id.
87. Id. at 161, 650 P.2d at 463.
88. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 526, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1986);
Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. App. 1985); Hall v. State, 482 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. App.
1985) aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. App. 1986).
89. Compare State v. Lockhart, 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (jury instruction
that protected a parent who, in good faith, chose spiritual treatment alone for treatment of a sick
child upheld on basis that the statute was clear and unambiguous and expressly indicated legislative intent consistent with jury instruction) with Walker v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 526,
222 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1986) (parents may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter for failing to
provide medical care to their children, regardless of religious beliefs favoring spiritual treatment).
90. by
664eCommons,
P.2d 1059 (Okla.
Published
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from peritonitis.9 1 The essential question for the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals was whether the state's religious-treatment exemption was intended to apply when the illness treated by religious methods was not trivial but life-threatening.92 Rejecting the state's argument that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that parents
could "justifiably" and "in good faith" select religious means over medical care for the treatment of their sick child,93 the appellate court declared that the statute was "clear and unambiguous" and protective of
parents "who rely in good faith upon the tenents [sic] of their religious
belief.""
9 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
In Commonwealth v. Barnhart,

wrestled with the issue of holding parents criminally liable for relying
on their faith in God rather than seeking medical care for their ill
child. The court declared that the religious rights of the parents do not
make them immune from the state's interest in the well-being of children. 96 Determining that parents had no choice but to seek medical
care when their child's physical condition was life-threatening, the
court explained that while the parents could, in the practice of their
religion, deny themselves medical care, they could not make the same
decision regarding their child's life without becoming liable for any resultant injury.9
In Hall v. State98 and in Bergmann v. State,99 two Indiana appel-

91. Id. at 1059-60; see also supra note 84 (defining peritonitis).
92. Lockhart, 664 P.2d at 1060.
93. Id. at 1059-60.
94. Id. at 1060. The Oklahoma legislature, perhaps fearing that the statute would be construed in a manner other than the intended one, passed an amendment limiting the statutory
defense to situations where only trivial or minor illnesses exist. See id. at 1060 n.1 (citing H.B.
1082, 39th Leg., istSess., 1983 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 160 (West) (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1988))). While the amendment was signed by the governor one month
before Lockhart's acquittal, it did not become effective until after the trial. Id.
95. 345 Pa. Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985) (parents were convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death of their two-year-old son from untreated Wilms' tumor). See also Comment, Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs
Causing Child's Death-Involuntary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90 DICK. L. REv. 861
(1986).
96. Id. at 24, 497 A.2d at 622-23.
97. Id. at 26, 497 A.2d at 624.
98. 482 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. App. 1985), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 493 N.E.2d 433
(Ind. App. 1986). In Hall, expert medical witnesses testified that the one-month-old boy who had
died of acute bilateral broncho-pneumonia and acute tracheo-bronchitis after five-day illness
would have had a "very reasonably good chance" of surviving if medical treatment had been
sought. 482 N.E.2d at 1187.
99. 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. App. 1985). In Bergmann, there was medical testimony that the
nine-month-old girl who died of bacterial meningitis after a ten-day illness had "no chance of
survival without medical treatment" and a "90%-95 %" chance of survival had medical treatment
been sought. Id. at 654-56, 662.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
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late courts used "back-handed" reasoning in finding parents criminally
liable despite the existence of a clearly applicable statutory religioustreatment exemption. Both courts first pointed out that a defense of
religious treatment must be proved like any other defense. Thus, reasoned the Indiana courts, since the juries had heard the defendants present their cases but had returned guilty verdicts, the defendants had
simply not carried the burden of proving the defense of religious treatment. Both courts held that the jury verdicts should be left undisturbed
since the existence of a religious-treatment defense was a question for
the trier of fact, and a question that the trier of fact had decided.' 00
California courts have also struggled with interpretation of the religious-treatment exemption. In People v. Arnold,'0 ' the California Supreme Court seriously questioned the validity of the prayer defense
when applied to a charge of manslaughter. The court ruled that the use
of religious treatment as a method of "other remedial care" did not
absolve a parent of his duty to supply needed medical care,10 2 stating
that "[the phrase 'other remedial care'

. . .

does not sanction unortho-

dox substitutes for 'medical attendance'; it indicates one of the multiple
necessities which the parent must provide."' 103
In Walker v. Superior Court,'"" a California appellate court was
asked to interpret the religious-treatment exemption, amended after
Arnold to clarify the phrase "other remedial care."' 05 The Walker
court stated that "[t]he 1976 amendment simply says that a parent's
duty to furnish other remedial care is satisfied if he or she provides
treatment by spiritual means through prayer. The 1976 amendment

100. Bergmann, 486 N.E.2d at 661; Hall, 482 N.E.2d at 1187.
101. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967) (mother was convicted of
misdemeanor manslaughter in the death of her thirteen-year-old daughter from a "totally blocked
intestine [which] caus[ed obstruction of the bowels and aspiration of fecal material into the
lungs").
102. Id. at 451-52, 426 P.2d at 523-24, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
103. Id.
104. 185 Cal. App. 3d 266, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1986).

105.

Id. at 273, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (treatment by prayer constitutes "other remedial

care").

The California religious-treatment exemption, contained in section 270 of the California Penal Code, provides that
[i]f a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary
clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he
or she is guilty of a misdemeanor . ...

If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone
in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof,.such treatment shall constitute 'other remedial care,' as used in this section.
CAL. PENAL
§ 270 (West
Published
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provides no exemption from any other legal duty." 10 6 The court stated

that parents will be criminally liable if the trier of fact determines that
the child's person or health has been endangered by substituting prayer
1 07

for medical care.
In recent years, statutory interpretation has challenged Ohio
courts as well. In State v. Miskimens,1 08 both the prosecution and the

defense attacked the Ohio child-endangerment statute. 10 9 The court in
Miskimens similarly criticized the statute's religious-treatment exemp-

tion: "In simplest terms, Ohio's present child endangering statute says
to parents: 'You may not violate your parental duties and thereby endanger your child's health or safety unless you and some of your coworshippers believe you can.' "110 To demonstrate the absurd "possibili-

ties engendered by the religious exemption," the court postulated a bizarre hypothetical:
[What if] the sacrament of baptism was to be accomplished not merely
by placing holy water on the head of a baby or even by total immersion,
but rather by throwing the infant into a deep and swift flowing river and
then permitting assistance to the helpless child only by "spiritual means
through prayer alone." How many babies would have to die in this manner before the state would be justified in seeking to regulate this "religious practice"? The answer should be obvious."'

Reasoning that it was just as wrong "to permit an innocent and helpless child to be overwhelmed, not by turbid waters, but by a chestful
[sic] of what doctors call 'purulent exudate' and everyone else calls

106. Walker, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (emphasis added).
,107. Id. at 283, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (dictum).
108. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. 1984) (parents were charged with involuntary manslaughter in the death of their thirteen-month-old son whose only treatment for illness
was by prayer).
109. Id. at 43, 490 N.E.2d at 933. The Ohio child-endangerment statute reads as follows:
No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or
person in loco parentis of a child under twenty-one years of age, shall create a substantial
risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.
It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or support under this division when the
parent, guardian, custodian, or person having custody or control of a child treats the physical or mental illness or defect of the child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in
accordance with the tenets of a recognized religious body.
Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987).
The state argued that the statute violated either: "(I) the Religious Establishment Clause or
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, or (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or (3) the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 43, 490 N.E.2d at 933. In contrast, the defendants argued that
the statute was "too vague or too broad." Id.
110. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 44, 490 N.E.2d at 933-34.
111. Id. at 45-46, 490 N.E.2d at 935.
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plain old 'pus,' "11 the court held that "the second sentence of Ohio
Revised Code section 2919.22(A) is clearly violative of the Constitution
of the United States and must therefore be declared to be of no force
or effect within this jurisdiction."'
A similar challenge to the constitutionality of section 2919.22(A)
of the Ohio Revised Code was recently considered in the Mercer
County Court of Common Pleas. In State v. Miller,1 " the defendants,
members of the Indiana-based Faith Assembly," 5 were charged with
felony child endangerment after their twenty-three-month-old daughter
died of untreated pneumonia and bronchitis." 6 As in Miskimens, the
defendants in Miller pointed to their "treatment" by prayer, relying on
the religious-treatment exemption contained in Ohio law. 1
The court in Miller concluded that the parents had "recklessly
created a substantial risk to the health and safety of the child by violating a duty of care and protection" 1 5 embodied in the first sentence of
Ohio Revised Code section 2919.22(A) 1 a" However, since the defendants had proved they had treated their daughter "in accordance with
the tenets of a recognized religious body," their conduct was protected
under the second sentence of Ohio Revised Code section 2919.22(A),
and they could not be found guilty. 120
The court followed Miskimens in holding that the second sentence
of section 2919.22(A) was unconstitutional. 21 However, the Mercer
County court also held that the statute was divisible.122 Therefore, in
future child-endangerment cases tried in Mercer County, defendants
will no longer be able to claim the protection of the second sentence of
section 2919.22(A).1 28

112.

Id.

113.

Id. at 47, 490 N.E.2d at 936.

114.

Nos. 86-CRM-30, 86-CRM-31 (Ohio C.P., Mercer County, Apr. 27, 1987).

115.

See Legislators Wrestle with Legal Faith-Healing Issue, supra note 6.

116.
117.
118.

Miller, Nos. 86-CRM-30, 86-CRM-31, slip. op. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.at 3.

119.

For the text of § 2919.22(A), see supra note 109.

120.

Miller, Nos. 86-CRM-30, 86-CRM-31, slip op. at 4.

121. Id. Agreeing with Coshocton County Judge Richard Evans' opinion in Miskimens.
Judge Dean James of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas held in Miller that the second
sentence of section 2919.22(A) violated the first amendment by creating an "impermissible rela-

tionship between the church and state" as well as the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id.
122. Id. at 7 ("[T]he first sentence stands even though the second sentence falls.").
123.byId.
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Legislative Evolution and the Present Problem

Included in nearly every state's child-protection laws, 2 " religioustreatment exemptions evolved as a response to the enactment by Congress of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974.125
The Act provided funding for programs developed to prevent, identify,
and treat child abuse and neglect.12 6 Regulations 127 developed to implement the Act included a religious-belief exemption 12 8 that has had stat-

utory ramifications in nearly every state. Under regulations established
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,129 states were
required to adopt a definition of child abuse and neglect similar to that
developed by the Secretary of HEW' in order to qualify for federal
definition similar
program funding.'' Most states adopted a statutory
13 2
to that contained within the federal regulation.
New regulations governing the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act were promulgated in 1983118 when the definition of "negligent treatment or maltreatment" was amended to include "failure to
provide medical care."'"' States were required to amend their childprotection laws to make the failure to provide adequate medical care a
reportable incident of child abuse.' Additionally, federal funding was

124. See statutes cited supra note 4.
125. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, amended by Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat. 205.
126. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(a), 88
Stat. 4, 5. See generally Note, The HHS' Final Rule on Health Carefor Handicapped Infants:
Equal Protection Not Guaranteed, 11 J. LEGiSl 269 (1984).
127. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2 to .3-8 (1975). Child abuse and neglect is defined as "harm
or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare by a person responsible for the child's health or
welfare." Id. § 1340.1-2(b).
128. Id. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) states:
'Harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare' can occur through: Non-accidental physical or mental injury; sexual abuse, as defined by State law; or negligent treatment
or maltreatment, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter. Provided, However, that a parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who
thereby does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall
not be considered a negligent parent or guardian: However, such an exception shall not
preclude a court from ordering that medical services be provided to the child, where his
health requires it.
129. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was redesignated in 1980
as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1982).
130. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1975).
131. Id. § 1340.14(b).
132. See statutes cited supra note 4.
133. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, Final Rule, 48 Fed.
Reg. 3697 (1983) (amending 45 C.F.R. § 1340).
134. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(i) (1983) ("'Negligent treatment or maltreatment' includes
failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.").
135. Id. § 1340.14(b).
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no longer contingent on the inclusion of the religious-treatment exemp-

tion; the exemption became an "optional" term. 136 In the last four

years, very few states have amended or even attempted to amend their
child-protection laws. 1 7 However, recent actions by the Department of
Health and Human Services might lead one to conclude that the federal government now "suggests" removal of the exemption in much the

same manner as it once strong-armed the exemption's adoption.1 8
III.

ANALYSIS

There is no doubt that state child-protection statutes containing
religious-treatment exemptions fail to protect ill or injured children in
need of medical care. Nonetheless, as offensive as these statutes appear,
most courts have been unwilling to take assertive action against them.
A.

Prioritizingthe Rights of the Parties Involved
In deciding whether to uphold religious-treatment exemptions in

child-endangerment statutes, courts must consider the rights and responsibilities of both the parents and the state as well as the rights of
the defenseless child.

136. Id. § 1340.2(d)(3)(ii). This section provides in part:
Nothing in this part should be construed as requiring or prohibiting a finding of negligent
treatment or maltreatment when a parent practicing his or her religious beliefs does not,
for that reason alone, provide medical treatment for a child; provided, however, that if such
a finding is prohibited, the prohibition shall not limit the administrative or judicial authority of the State to insure that medical services are provided to the child when his health
requires it.
137. Compare OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987) (treatment of child's
illness through spiritual means does not violate duty of care if such treatment was in accordance
with the tenets of a recognized religious group) with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp.
1988) (spiritual treatment in accordance with religious tenets does not constitute child endangerment so long as medical care is provided when there is a risk that the child will suffer permanent,
physical damage).
138. See Letter from Robert E. Moman, Acting Regional Administrator of the Office of
Human Development Services, United States Department of Health and Human Services to Patricia Barry, Director of the Ohio Department of Human Services (May 20, 1987) (stating that
federal law requires that states report, investigate, and treat all instances of child abuse and
neglect to meet eligibility requirements for federal grants) (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review) [hereinafter Letter]; see also Ohio Urged to Drop 'Faith-Healing'Child Abuse Exemption, Columbus Dispatch, June 12, 1987, at Cl, col. 1. Moman informed Barry that both the
express and implicit reporting exceptions relating to the religious-treatment exemptions in child
abuse reporting and treatment laws must be deleted to be in compliance with federal requirements. He stated that House Bill 63, which would delete entirely the religious-treatment exemptions, would resolve Ohio's noncompliance problems. Letter, supra, at 2. However, he did acknowledge that retention of the exemption in the child-endangerment statute "will not affect
Ohio's compliance status." Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 192-97 (discussing federal
demands for amendment of child abuse and neglect laws and the further need for pressure to
repeal exemptions to criminal liability in child-endangerment laws as well).
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1. Parental Autonomy
Parents have the right to direct the upbringing and education of
their children'1 9 without undue adverse interference by the state.1,4 0
"[T] he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents
. . . and it is in recognition of this that . . . decisions have respected
the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." 41 The
care and keeping of children is an inherent responsibility of parenthood
and an obligation well-established by common and statutory law. 4 Included in this concept of care and keeping is the obligation to provide
needed medical care. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances,
to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." ' Consequently, a two-fold dilemma exists in the child-raising
arena: To what limits can such parental rights be exercised in relation
to the health and welfare of a child, and who has the authority to restrict these rights?
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has used the
doctrine of substantive due process to protect certain non-economic,
fundamental rights in the areas of sex, marriage, childbearing, and
child-rearing. 4 4 By doing so, the Court has adopted a concept of family privacy, acknowledging that there are limits on the government's
authority to intrude in our lives. Since the Supreme Court has found
child-rearing to be a fundamental right, ' 5 the state must show that
any restriction on child-rearing furthers a compelling state interest and
that the objective cannot be achieved in a less restrictive way. 146 In
religious-treatment exemption cases, however, courts cannot examine
rights of family privacy in isolation but must also consider the right to
practice freely one's religion.
The first amendment prohibits government from making a law

139. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1979).
140. Id. at 637.
141. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
142. See statutes cited supra note 4.
143. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
144. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (government cannot impose restrictions on family living arrangements);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state law outlawing abortion infringes on right of privacy);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state law outlawing contraceptives intrudes on
marital privacy).
145. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state statute
preventing children from attending private or parochial schools and instead requiring public school
attendance).
146. Id. at 518-21.
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that will prohibit the free exercise of religion.14 7 Consequently, Congress has been denied legislative control of religious opinions and beliefs.148 Traditionally, however, Congress has been "left free to reach
actions which [are] in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order."" 9 "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society."' 0 Although family privacy is protected, "[tihe family itself is
not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. . . . And neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation."'' Similarly, "[tihe right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death." 52
One strong view states that regardless of their religious beliefs,
parents who fail to provide necessary medical care have breached the
parental obligation of care and keeping. Children are entitled to live in
homes where, in the event of illness or injury, medical care is provided.
In cases where a child's welfare is jeopardized, the state's interest is
compelling; 8 3 therefore, the state acts within a legitimate realm of authority when it invades the rights of the parent and orders appropriate
care or treatment.'" "If there is a direct collision of a child's right to
good health and a parent's religious beliefs, the parent's rights must
give way."' 5'
2.

The State as Parens Patriae

The state's authority over children is more encompassing than its
authority over adults.' 5 6 Because the child is a citizen of the state, he
belongs not only to his parents but also to the state.15 7 Consequently,
the parents and the state have many duties relating to the child's welfare.' 8 "Chief among them is the duty to protect his right to live and
to grow up with a sound mind in a sound body.' 5 9
In the role of parens patriae,the state oversees the general welfare

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 164.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Id. at 166-67.
In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (1986).
Id. at 199, 493 N.E.2d at 1389.
Cochise County Juvenile Action, supra note 84, 133 Ariz. at 162, 650 P.2d at 464.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (C.P. 1962).
Id.
Id.
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of its youth.160 The state may limit parental control even where parents
can point to religious beliefs and practices.1 6 When child welfare is at
issue, "the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority." '
The state's authority over children's activities must . . . be broader than
it is over adults if those of tender years are to be protected against some
clear and present danger. Adults are ordinarily free to make choices denied to those of less than full age, but when those choices threaten the
welfare of a child, the state must intervene. 1
The existence of religious-treatment exemptions in child-protection
laws is inconsistent with the basic obligation of the state as parens patriae to protect children and to care for them when parents do not.
Such exemptions only protect parents who endanger children.
3.

The Rights of the Minor Child

Although the number of children who die each year from the substitution of religious treatment for medical care is a statistically insignificant number, it is nonetheless appalling that our modern society
would allow any child to "drown" from the pus of pneumonia accumulating in his lungs'" or suffer the tremendous pain accompanying a
strangulated gangrenous hernia that eventually ruptures, expelling stool
and pus throughout the abdominal cavity"16 Consequently, courts must
not balance the rights of the parents and the state without carefully
considering the rights of the child. Parental autonomy, limitable by the
state, must also be limitable by the rights of the child.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[m]inors, as well
as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights."1 6 Although parents are presumed to act in their child's best
interests, 6 7 there have been numerous cases where courts have appointed a guardian ad litem for a child, or have given a hospital or
physician complete authority to provide medical care.16 8 "[Tihe child is
entitled to have his or her basic needs cared for. If the parent fails to
furnish these needs, the state may and should act on behalf of the
160. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 167.
163. In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 199, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1390 (1986).
164. See State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (C.P. 1984).
165. See Cochise County Juvenile Action, supra note 84, 133 Ariz. at 157, 650 P.2d at 459.
166. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
167. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that no formal adversary hearing was
necessary before parents could commit their child to a mental institution since parents generally
are said to act in their child's best interest).
168. See, e.g., In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 493 N.E.2d 1388 (1986).
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child." 169 At least one court has stated that "the prayer exception [to
child protection laws] creates a group of children who will never be
. . . protected [from parental negligence], through no fault or choice of

their own." 1 70 A child is entitled to a home where, in the event of ill-

ness or injury, appropriate medical care will be pursued.171 Children
should be guaranteed special protection until they are old enough to

make their own decisions regarding medical care and religious practices.172 Simply because a child is a child, this protection must not be
denied. Children especially must be protected in situations "where the
denial of that protection may injure or cripple the child for life or even
result in that child's premature death.' 7 8 State courts often quote the
following passage in Prince v. Massachusetts 74

Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves.17 5
A child's right to good health supersedes the parents' religious beliefs.
Consequently, religious doctrine must give way to preserve a child's
76

life.'

Although the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of protection

provided by the free-exercise clause, it appears that religious-treatment

exemptions to child-protection laws should not be constitutionally protected, even under Yoder's expansive view of the free-exercise clause.17

Based on the Supreme Court's past emphasis on child welfare,' 7 8 reli-

gious-treatment exemptions should not receive constitutional protection
when the lack of medical care leads to the endangerment of a child.

Nevertheless, state courts have been very cautious in deciding religioustreatment exemption cases. 17 9

169. Cochise County Juvenile Action, supra note 84, 133 Ariz. at 161, 650 P.2d at 463.
170. State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 46, 490 N.E.2d 931, 935 (C.P. 1984).
171. Cochise County Juvenile Action, supra note 84, 133 Ariz. at 161, 650 P.2d at 463.
172. See Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 46, 490 N.E.2d at 935-36.
173. Id. at 46, 490 N.E.2d at 935.
174. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
175. Id. at 170, quoted in Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934 and in In
re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 669, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 652 (Fam. Ct. 1970), affid, 29 N.Y.2d
900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
176. See, e.g., In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 493 N.E.2d 1380 (1986); People ex
rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
177. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (discussed supra notes 39-46
and accompanying text).
178. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-34; see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67; Jehovah's
Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affid mem., 390 U.S. 598
(1968).
179. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (discussed supra note 64); In
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Balancing the Competing Interests of the Parties

The modern approach to situations where a governmental regulation unintentionally imposes restrictions on religious beliefs is twopronged. First, there must be a compelling state objective for the specific regulation. Second, such a regulation must be the least restrictive
means available.18 0 A state's interest in child welfare and preservation
of life is a compelling one."' 1 Although legislatures and courts have
tried to consider parental child-rearing rights and family privacy with
great deference,182 state interference in certain situations is warranted.
When potential for harm to children is significantly great, the state
must interfere and restrict the harmful activity; state child abuse and
neglect statutes were promulgated for this very reason. Parental rights
are quite far-reaching but they are not absolute.183 When parental failure to fulfill specific obligations places a child's health and safety at
risk, the compelling interests of the state in child welfare mandate
intervention.
Repeal of religious-treatment exemptions is entirely within the
state's authority and will satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in
Sherbert: child welfare is a compelling state interest and no alternative
less restrictive than complete repeal would protect children sufficiently.
It would be cumbersome and complex to establish specific criteria for a
"middle of the road" system that would determine when parents could
rely on religious treatment or when they would be required to seek
medical care. In addition, absent a "window-peeking" surveillance system, it would be virtually impossible to monitor whether or not homes
contained ill or injured children and to decide when prayer had to give
way to medical help. Consequently, in balancing the interests of the
state, the parents, and the child, the state's compelling interest in child
welfare supersedes parental rights when a child is ill or injured.
The very existence of religious-treatment exemptions in child-endangerment and child abuse and neglect statutes directly conflicts with
the state's compelling interest in child welfare. It is illogical that the
state can have such a compelling interest yet allow parents to offer
prayers and scriptural readings instead of medical care for an ill or
injured child.
What can be done to stop the tragedy and to provide instead the

re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (discussed supra note 64).
180. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406-09 (1963) (discussed supra text accompanying note 38).
181. Prince, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944).
182. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/5
183. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-67.
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constitutional protection each child deserves? Logically, parents must
be required to provide necessary medical care. Thus, state legislatures

must reexamine their role in promoting child health and welfare. State
statutes can no longer allow parents to conduct prayer vigils instead of
seeking medical care for their children.
C. The Need for Legislative Change

Child-protection laws at federal and state levels present an ironic

twist: the very laws promulgated to protect child health and welfare

deprive children of needed medical care and, in turn, protect parents
whose belief in "healing by prayer" facilitates a child's death. The time
is ripe for sweeping national reform to remove religious-treatment exemptions from child-protection laws. Such a reform would reflect the
government's aim to protect the individual interests of defenseless chil-

dren. In addition, despite pressures from religious organizations,'8
such a reform would survive a first amendment challenge.1 a5

1. Removal of Religious-Treatment Exemptions
Suggestions have been made to modify existing statutory exemptions by including a parental-good-faith component or a provision that
medical care must be provided when the illness or injury could result in
permanent disability or death.' 86 Such limited exemptions establish
only another standard for courts to apply after a tragedy has occurred.
So long as statutory language presents a "now-you-see-it, now-you-

don't approach"

87

the standard will remain largely unascertaina-

184. See infra note 191 and accompanying text; see also Legislators Wrestle with Legal
Faith-Healing Issue. supra note 6; Faith-Healing Bill Stalled till January, Dayton Daily News
and Journal Herald, July 5, 1987, at 2-B, col. 2.
185. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
186. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1988) which provides in part:
Unless otherwise provided for by law, any parent or legal custodian of a child who willfully
omits, without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed upon such parent or legal custodian by law to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for such
child, upon conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor. As used in this section, the duty to
furnish medical attention shall mean that the parent or legal custodian of a child must
furnish medical treatment in such manner and on such occasions as an ordinarily prudent
person, solicitous for the welfare of a child, would provide; such parent or legal custodian is
not criminally liable for failure to furnish medical attendance for every minor or trivial
complaint with which the child may be afflicted. . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean a child is endangered for the sole reason the parent or guardian, in good
faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone through prayer, in accordance with
the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination, for the treatment
or cure of disease or remedial care of such child; provided, that medical care shall be
provided where permanent physical damage could result to such child, and that the laws,
rules, and regulations relating to communicable diseases and sanitary matters are not
violated.
187.
State v. Miskimens,
Published
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ble-therefore impossible for parents to follow-and children will continue to die.
Moreover, statutes establishing "magical moments in time" when
medical care must supplement religious treatment also fail to provide
adequate guidance to parents and protection to children. It is virtually
impossible to statutorily establish when prayer must give way to medical care without creating an enormous set of overwhelmingly fact-specific standards: When is a child's body temperature too high? A child's
vomiting too severe? When are too many fluids being lost due to vomiting and diarrhea? When are listlessness and lethargy no longer a byproduct of the healing process but rather an indication of more serious
problems? The average parent could hardly be expected to understand
such a statute, let alone to recognize situations in which the statute
mandates medical care. Furthermore, the state has neither the resources nor the ability to monitor the homes of people who practice
religious treatment to determine when a child is ill or injured and legitimately in need of medical care. Therefore, all parents must be put on
notice before tragedy occurs so that every ill child will receive reasonable medical care. This can only be done by completely removing religious-treatment exemptions from child welfare statutes.
Children need clear and precise laws to protect them, laws that
spell out the penalties to be paid when a child dies without proper medical care. When such a death occurs, the child's parents should be
charged with involuntary manslaughter, whether or not the child received religious treatment. Although such a result would seem to directly penalize some parents for their religious beliefs, the liability goes
not to their beliefs but to "their decision effectively to forfeit their
child's life." 18 8 Parents should no longer be allowed to answer only to
their consciences, nor should state legislatures any longer support religious-treatment exemptions while trusting that parents will someday
answer to a higher authority.
2.

The Change Process and Its Ramifications

Legislative action is needed to repeal religious-treatment exemptions. Such action is needed not only in Ohio, but in every state where
such exemptions result in the deaths of children who could otherwise be
saved by readily-available medical care.
In Ohio, legislative proposals to repeal the exemption, most re-

also OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987).

188. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 26, 497 A.2d 616, 624 (1985) (citing
in accord Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (religious freedom does not include the right to expose a child to disease or potential death)).
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cently H.B. 63'as proposed during the 1987 session, have consistently
languished in committee.' 90 Proponents of the exemption's repeal have
attributed their lack of support from fellow legislators to a "well-organized" lobbying effort led by the Christian Science Church. 9 '
Perhaps threats by the federal government to withhold funds may
be the only way to overcome such powerful special interest group pressure. The federal government has threatened states with the loss of federal funds unless protection is provided for "Baby Doe" infants.' 9 2
Likewise, Congress should threaten loss of child abuse and "Baby Doe"
funds unless religious-treatment exemptions are repealed.
In fact, the Department of Health and Human Services has
threatened Ohio with the loss of about $450,000 in child abuse and
"Baby Doe" grant funds unless the state complies with federal requirements that all child abuse and neglect cases be reported and investigated and protective care provided. 9 3 To retain its funding, Ohio will
have to amend the definition of "neglected child" in the child abuse
and neglect statute 94 to remove the exemption for children who receive
religious treatment in lieu of medical care. 1"5
In any event, these federal demands fail to provide sufficient pro-

189. H.B. 63, supra note 8; see also H.B. 67, 116th General Assembly, Reg. Sess (Ohio
1985-1986).
190. See Faith-Healing Bill Stalled till January, supra note 184.
191. Telephone interview with Patricia Barry, Director of the Ohio Department of Human
Services (Sept. 22, 1987); see also Faith-Healing Bill Stalled till January, supra note 184.

Specifically, in 1985, State Representative Francine M. Panehal (D-Cleveland) refused to
allow the Children and Youth Committee to vote on H.B. 67, supra note 189, after a subcommittee approved the bill. See Atheists Protest Faith Healing, Columbus Dispatch, July 22, 1986, at
12D, col. 1;see also Sponsor Rejects Faith-Cure Bill,Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 21, 1986, at 4B,
col. 3. Furthermore, the version of the bill emerging from the committee more than a year later
had been gutted by supporters of the Christian Scientist lobby, and was rejected by the bill's
original sponsor, State Representative Paul Jones (D-Ravenna). See Sponsor Rejects Faith-Cure
Bill, supra, at 4B, col. 3 (Rep. Jones rejected the committee draft because it no longer would have
removed all religious treatment exemptions nor provided for criminal penalties).
192. Infants born with severe handicaps or deformities are commonly referred to as "Baby
Doe" infants. Until recent years, parents often chose to allow these infants to die by withholding
medically necessary treatment or nutrition from them. In October 1984, Congress amended part
of the Child Abuse Amendments to include a "Baby Doe" provision in an attempt to provide
protection for these infants. Under the new provision, states receive child abuse and "Baby Doe"
federal grant funds under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act only if they adopt laws
that provide that the withholding of medically-indicated treatment is considered medical neglect
and establish programs and procedures to respond to situations where treatment is withheld from
handicapped infants. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 122(3), 98 Stat.
1749, 1752, discussed in Gottesman, Civil Liability for Failing to Provide "'Medically Indicated
Treatment" to a Disabled Infant. 20 FAM. L.Q. 61 (Spring 1986).
193. See Ohio Urged to Drop 'Faith-Healing'Child Abuse Exemption. supra note 137; see

also Letter, supra note 137, at 2.
194.

195.

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.421, 2151.03(C) (Anderson 1987).

Letter, supra
Published by eCommons,note
1987137, at 2.

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 13:1

tection for children. While Ohio may be forced to amend statutes relating to the state's obligations to report and treat abused or neglected
children, it has been advised by the Department of Health and Human
Services that retention of the religious-treatment exemption in the
child-endangerment statute "will not affect Ohio's compliance status." 196 Since child-endangerment statutes address criminal liability for
parental neglect and not specifically the state's obligation to report and
treat child abuse and 97neglect, the agency is unfortunately unconcerned
1
with their existence.
The problem of child abuse and neglect must be attacked not only
by requiring states to report and treat abused children, but also by providing criminal liability for all forms of child abuse-including the failure to provide medical care. Although the present federal threats put
pressure on the states to protect abused and neglected children, they do
nothing to stop the contrary signals given out by state statutes containing religious-treatment exemptions. To ensure that children receive all
necessary care, the federal government should withhold child abuse and
"Baby Doe" funds until states repeal existing religious-treatment exemptions and clearly establish that parents are criminally liable for the
denial of needed medical care.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While parental rights of child-rearing and of free exercise of religion are important ones, the state's primary concern must be the vulnerable and defenseless child. Thus, parental decisions to substitute religious treatment for medical care should not be protected by the firstamendment free-exercise clause when such decisions endanger a child's
life. It is preposterous to rationalize that deaths resulting from such
neglect are "God's will," since that same God has provided us with the
intellect and technology necessary to sustain and promote optimum
health and welfare.1 98
Moreover, state statutes protecting children provide no actual protection when the statutes contain religious-treatment exemptions: such
exemptions protect only the parents who have jeopardized their child's
life. Therefore, in the interest of child welfare, state legislatures must
be pressured to repeal all religious-treatment exemptions.
Donna K. LeClair

196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
See Mortimer, supra note 4, at 9A, col. 4.
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